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ALTHOUGH INSURANCE LAW 3420(d)(2) REQUIRING TIMELY NOTICE OF THE DISCLAIMER OF INSURANCE COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT (AS OPPOSED TO A PERSONAL INJURY) ACTION, THE DISCLAIMERS WERE UNTIMELY UNDER COMMON LAW WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL PRINCIPLES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurance companies’ disclaimers of coverage of damages associated with the insured’s breach of contract were not timely. The insured county was found to have breached a contract and was assessed nearly $11,000,000 in damages:

Contrary to the County’s contention, while Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) imposes strict requirements on an insurer to give timely written notice if it is disclaiming liability or denying coverage for death or bodily injury arising out of an accident, “[w]here, as here, the underlying insurance claim does not arise out of an accident involving bodily injury or death, Insurance Law § 3420 and its heightened requirements do not apply” … . Instead, an insurer’s delay in disclaiming coverage “should be considered under common-law waiver and/or estoppel principles” … . …

Here, the County proffered evidence that * * * [the innsurers] did not respond [for] 6 months and 17 months, respectively, after they were notified of the subject loss. County of Suffolk v Ironshore Indem., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06099, Second Dept 10-28-20

 

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