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PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW BY MAKING A LEFT TURN DIRECTLY INTO DEFENDANT’S PATH OF TRAVEL WHEN DEFENDANT HAD A GREEN LIGHT; PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT WAS SPEEDING WAS NOT ENOUGH TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant driver was entitled to summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case. Defendant had the right-of-way (green light) when plaintiff made a left turn directly into defendant’s path of travel. Plaintiff’s testimony that defendant was speeding was not enough to raise a question of fact:

“A violation of a standard of care imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se” … . “Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 provides that the driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection . . . shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Further, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a) provides that no person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection . . . until such movement can be made with reasonable safety” … . “Although a driver with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other driver will obey the traffic laws requiring him or her to yield, a driver is bound to see what is there to be seen through the proper use of his or her senses and is negligent for failure to do so” … . However, “a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … . * * *

… [P]laintiff’s contention that the defendant was operating his vehicle at an excessive speed “is speculative and unsupported by any competent evidence” … . The defendant testified at his deposition that he was driving below the speed limit, and the plaintiff admitted during her deposition that she did not see the defendant’s vehicle prior to the collision … . Although evidence regarding the force of a collision or the manner in which a vehicle moved as a result thereof may be sufficient to create an inference that a driver was speeding in some circumstances … , the plaintiff’s deposition testimony was not sufficient to create such an inference … . Further, the plaintiff’s “contention[ ] that [the defendant] could have avoided the accident . . . w[as] speculative and unsupported by the record … . Morante v Blaney, 2025 NY Slip Op 00086, Second Dept 1-8-25

Practice Point: Although proof that defendant driver with the right-of-way was speeding when the plaintiff driver violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by making a left turn may raise a question of fact, here plaintiff driver’s testimony standing alone, claiming defendant was speeding, was not enough to raise a question of fact.

 

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