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A MINOR INJURY TO ONE CHILD BY ANOTHER WHILE MOTHER WAS NAPPING NEARBY, AND A SUBSEQUENT VERBAL ARGUMENT WITH THE POLICE, DID NOT AMOUNT TO NEGLECT BY MOTHER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined the single incident in which one child injured another while mother was napping and a subsequent verbal argument with the police did not amount to neglect:

Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a minor accident involving two of the children while the mother was napping constituted neglect. The agency’s proof that the brother had a minor injury to his neck after an isolated incident did not establish that the child’s mental or emotional condition was impaired or in imminent danger of being impaired as a result of the incident, or that the mother failed to exercise a minimum degree of care … . Indeed, the brother was without any visible injury shortly after the incident. Nor did the incident cause any impairment or imminent danger to the daughter or to the baby, who was asleep in the next room. Although an isolated accidental injury may constitute neglect if the parent was aware of an intrinsically dangerous situation … , there is no evidence that the mother’s napping while the children were in close proximity and within earshot was intrinsically dangerous.

Similarly, Family Court’s finding that the mother’s interaction with the police in any respect rose to the level of neglect is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A verbal argument with a police officer did not pose any serious or potentially serious harm to the infant child, who was the only child with her at that time … . Matter of Rebecca F. (Danequea J.), 2025 NY Slip Op 00042, First Dept 1-7-25

Practice Point: One child inflicted a minor injury on another while mother was napping nearby. Subsequently mother argued with the police when she was not allowed back in the apartment to get her cell phone charger. These incidents did not support Family Court’s neglect finding.

 

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