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THE PETITION FOR GUARDIANSHIP OF THE CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE PETITIONER IS NOT RELATED TO THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the petition for guardianship of the child should not have been dismissed on the ground petitioner was not a relative. The applicable provision of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA 1703) states the petition can be brought by “any person:”

​Although the petitioner is not biologically related to the child, SCPA 1703, which is applicable to this proceeding (see Family Ct Act § 661), provides that a petition for the appointment of a guardian may be brought by “any person” (SCPA 1703 …). Nor was there any basis in the record to dismiss the petition with prejudice … .  Matter of Karma-Marie W. (Jerry W.), 2025 NY Slip Op 00104, Second Dept 1-8-25

Practice Point: Pursuant to SCPA 1703 “any person” may petition for guardianship of a child. There is no requirement that petitioner be related to the child.

 

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