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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN A LYFT CAR WHICH HAD BEEN ORDERED BY HIS FRIEND THROUGH THE FRIEND’S ACCOUNT; BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD SCROLLED THROUGH AND AGREED TO LYFT’S TERMS OF SERVICE, WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, who used another’s Lyft account to order transportation, and who was injured in an accident involving the Lyft car, was subject to an arbitration provision in the contract between Lyft and the account-holder. Whether the plaintiff was bound by the arbitration clause was deemed to be an issue to be decided by the arbitrator:

Arbitration must be compelled because plaintiff was a party to an arbitration agreement with Lyft that expressly delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. It is undisputed that, prior to the subject accident, plaintiff scrolled through and agreed to Lyft’s Terms of Service (the TOS), which included an agreement to arbitrate. As part of the arbitration agreement, the parties agreed to delegate “disputes concerning the arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement)” to the arbitrator. When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties’ decision “even if the arguments of the party seeking to arbitrate ‘appear[] to the court to be frivolous’ or even ‘wholly groundless'” … .

There is no dispute that if plaintiff had ordered the subject ride through his own Lyft account, then the instant claims would be subject to arbitration because plaintiff was party to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement with a valid and enforceable delegation provision — even if there were a question as to the arbitration agreement’s scope … . We find that the question of whether the agreement to arbitrate encompassed claims stemming from plaintiff’s presence in a Lyft that he did not order is a question of arbitrability that must be decided by the arbitrator … . Samuel v Islam, 2024 NY Slip Op 06675, First Dept 12-31-24

Practice Point: If you scroll through and agree to the terms of service when a Lyft car is ordered though another’s account, and you are subsequently injured in an accident in the Lyft car, you are compelled to arbitrate the question whether you are subject to the arbitration clause just as the account-holder would be.

 

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