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THE STIPULATION OF DIVORCE DIVESTED THE HUSBAND OF HIS RIGHTS IN THE MARITAL PROPERTY; THEREFORE THE HUSBAND’S JUDGMENT CREDITOR COULD NOT REACH THE PROPERTY EVEN THOUGH THE HUSBAND’S NAME REMAINED ON THE DEED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the stipulation of divorce awarding the marital property to the wife, Tiozzo, controlled such that the property could not be reached by the husband’s, Dangin’s, judgment creditor, Lenz. Lenz unsuccessfully argued the property was fair game because Dangin’s name remained on the deed:

The stipulation of divorce thus divested Dangin of his rights in the subject property. Under CPLR article 52 a judgment creditor may only seek to enforce its money judgment against a judgment debtor’s property. “Property” under CPLR 5201(b), whether realty or personalty, is defined broadly as an interest that is present or future, vested or contingent … . However, the determining factor as to whether a judgment debtor’s interest can constitute property vulnerable to a judgment creditor is whether it “could be assigned or transferred” (CPLR 5201[b]). In the stipulation of divorce Dangin gave up any right to assign or transfer to a third party an interest in the subject property. The subject property is therefore beyon.d the reach of Lenz … . Tiozzo v Dangin, 2021 NY Slip Op 04739, First Dept 8-19-21

 

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