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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES.

The First Department determined there was question of fact whether the UPS truck parked in a no-standing zone was a proximate cause of plaintiff-bicyclist’s injuries. Plaintiff alleged the protrusion of the UPS into the lane of travel forced him to swerve toward a bus and then jump from his bicycle:

Defendant UPS argues that, although its truck was parked in a no-standing zone in violation of 34 RCNY 4-08(a)(3) at the time of the accident involving plaintiff’s bicycle and defendant MTA’s bus, its truck was not a proximate cause of the accident. However, the record presents issues of fact as to how far the UPS truck was protruding into the lane of travel, whether plaintiff swerved toward the bus in an effort to avoid the UPS truck, and whether plaintiff was forced to jump from his bicycle in order to avoid being slammed into the UPS truck as his bicycle was being dragged by the bus. Since a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the accident was a foreseeable consequence of UPS’s illegal parking, summary judgment was properly denied … . Santana v MTA Bus Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 05450, 1st Dept 7-7-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHERE PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES)/BICYCLE ACCIDENTS (QUESTION OF FACT WHERE PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES)/PARKED VEHICLES (QUESTION OF FACT WHERE PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES)

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