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PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A LADDER WHICH FELL BECAUSE IT WAS PLACED ON A SLIPPERY MAT; PLAINTFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 causes of action should not have been granted. In addition, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was working at ground level. A coworker placed a ladder on a mat which was covered with cow manure and started climbing the ladder. The ladder slipped on the mat and fell, hitting plaintiff on the head:

​The failure to properly place and secure the ladder amounted to a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Moreover, the violation of Labor Law § 240(1) proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries because the plaintiff was injured when the ladder “proved inadequate to shield [him] from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” … . …

… [T]he coworker’s improper placement of the ladder was not of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuated from a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) as to sever the causal nexus between the defendant’s statutory violation and the plaintiff’s injuries … . …

“In order to prevail on a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1), the plaintiff must establish that the job was a hard hat job, and that the plaintiff’s failure to wear a hard hat was a proximate cause of his [or her] injury” … . Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the relevant work was not a hard hat job or that the plaintiff’s lack of head protection played no role in the injuries he sustained when he was struck in the head by the ladder … .

12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii) provides that “[a]ll ladder footings shall be firm. Slippery surfaces and insecure objects such as bricks and boxes shall not be used as ladder footings.” Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the rubber mat covered with cow manure and hay was not a slippery surface for the purpose of 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii). …

“Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or employer to provide employees with a safe place to work” … . … When a claim is based on an alleged dangerous condition of a work site, the defendant may be liable where he or she had actual or constructive notice of the condition or created the condition … . A defendant has constructive notice of a defect when it is visible and apparent and has existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident such that it could have been discovered and corrected … . Here, the defendant’s conclusory statements in his affidavit that he did not recall having entered the barn on the day of the accident and that he was unaware of the plaintiff’s accident were insufficient to establish, prima facie, that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged slippery condition … . Wright v Pennings, 2024 NY Slip Op 06233, Second Dept 12-11-24

Practice Point: A coworker placed a ladder on a slippery mat and the ladder fell and struck plaintiff when the coworker started to climb it. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. The coworker’s actions did not sever the causal connection between the statutory violation (an unsecured ladder) and plaintiff’s injuries.

 

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PLAINTIFF PREVAILED IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION; HOWEVER, ABSENT A CONTRACT... AN INCIDENT WHICH “COULD OR SHOULD HAVE REASONABLY BEEN ANTICIPATED”...