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Motion to Set Aside Verdict Properly Denied—The Jury Determined Defendant’s Negligence Was Not the Proximate Cause of the Accident—Analytical Criteria Explained

In finding the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence was properly denied, the Second Department explained how to analyze the jury’s conclusion the defendant’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident:

A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence … . “A jury’s finding that a party was at fault but that such fault was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause” … . “[W]here there is a reasonable view of the evidence under which it is not logically impossible to reconcile a finding of negligence but no proximate cause, it will be presumed that, in returning such a verdict, the jury adopted that view” … . Moffett-Knox v Anthony’s Windows on the Lake, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 01929, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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