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Criteria for Labor Law 200 and Common Law Negligence Causes of Action Explained

The Second Department affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants on the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action. Plaintiff was working on a roof when a co-worker’s water jug rolled down the roof, struck him and caused him to fall to the roof. The complaint alleged the injury arose from the manner the work was performed and from a dangerous condition.  The court noted that, because the complaint alleged both theories of liability, the summary judgment motion must address both. The court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

“Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty of landowners and general contractors to provide workers with a reasonably safe place to work” … . “To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed at a work site, an owner or manager of real property must have authority to exercise supervision and control over the work at the site” … . However, “the right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor’s work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence” … . “Where a plaintiff’s injuries stem not from the manner in which the work was being performed, but, rather, from a dangerous condition on the premises, a [defendant] may be liable under Labor Law § 200 if it either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition'” … . Where an accident is alleged to involve both a dangerous condition on the premises and the “means and methods” of the work, a defendant moving for summary judgment with respect to causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards … . * * *

The defendants established, prima facie, both that they did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition which caused the injured plaintiff’s accident, and that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the injured plaintiff’s work … . In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Banscher v Actus Lend Lease, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 07461, 2nd Dept 10-14-15

 

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Two-Hour Interval Did Not Return Defendant to Status of One Who Was Not Under... Upward Departure from Level One to Three Not Warranted by the Evidence