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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF THE SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING TO ALLOW REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS WHICH MAY BE RELEVANT TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court and ordering a new SORA risk-level assessment, determined defendant’s attorney’s request for an adjournment to allow review of documents relevant to a downward departure should have been granted:

… County Court improvidently exercised its discretion when it denied the defendant’s request for an adjournment. The defendant’s open release date two days after the hearing was not a sufficient reason to deny the defendant’s request for an adjournment (see Correction Law § 168-l[8]). Further, the documents discussed by the defendant, including documents relating to his participation in treatment programs, may be relevant to support an application for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level. “A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of ‘(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the . . . Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence'” … . “In making the determinations the court shall review . . . any relevant materials and evidence submitted by the sex offender” … . “An offender’s response to treatment, if exceptional, can be the basis for a downward departure” … . As the documents cited by the defendant were potentially material, the adjournment request was not made for the purposes of delay, and the necessity of the request was not due to a failure of due diligence, the court should have granted the request to adjourn the SORA hearing so that the defendant’s counsel could review the documents and determine whether they should be offered to the court as evidence at the hearing. People v Eldridge, 2024 NY Slip Op 05117, Second Dept 10-16-24

Practice Point: Here defense counsel’s request for an adjournment of the SORA risk-level proceeding to allow review of documents which may be relevant to a downward departure should have been granted. Defense counsel was not able to meet with the defendant until 15 minutes before the hearing, the request was not made to delay, and the fact that defendant had an upcoming open release date was not a sufficient reason to deny an adjournment.

 

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