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You are here: Home1 / Labor Law-Construction Law2 / A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION UNDER LABOR...
Labor Law-Construction Law, Negligence

A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION UNDER LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (PREMISES LIABILITY); BUT A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CANNOT BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) OR 241(6) FOR CONSTRUCTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a prior owner of property may be liable pursuant to Labor Law 200 and common law negligence for a dangerous condition which the new owner did not have time to remedy, but prior owners cannot be liable under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) which relate to construction activities:

… Supreme Court properly denied those branches of Federal Brick’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against it to the extent that they sounded in premises liability. … Federal Brick failed to establish, prima facie, that it could not be held liable for the allegedly dangerous premises condition as a former owner. Inasmuch as “Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty of property owners and general contractors to provide workers with a safe place to work” … .

… T]he “narrow exception” that allows for premises liability to be extended to prior owners of property … does not apply to the statutory liability imposed by Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). Those statutes apply to certain construction-related activities … , rather than premises conditions for which a prior owner might remain responsible. Quintero v MBH Capital, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03010, Second Dept 5-13-26

Practice Point: Under some circumstances a prior property owner may be liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition if the new owner has not yet had time to learn of it and remedy it. This prior-owner liability may be pursunat Labor-Law-200 and common-law negligence theories.

 

May 13, 2026
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-13 13:26:342026-05-17 20:44:02A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION UNDER LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (PREMISES LIABILITY); BUT A PRIOR PROPERTY OWNER CANNOT BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) OR 241(6) FOR CONSTRUCTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES (SECOND DEPT).
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