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STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff-student’s action against the school board and municipality stemming from the student’s being struck by a car crossing a street after school was properly dismissed. No crossing guard was provided for the street where the student crossed, but a crossing guard was routinely provided  for a street a block away and that guard was out sick on the day of the accident. No special relationship with the municipality was demonstrated. Because the student had been dismissed from the school, the negligent supervision cause of action was not viable:

A municipal defendant is immune from negligence claims arising from the performance of its governmental functions unless the injured person can establish a special relationship with the municipal defendant … . The elements of a special relationship based on a voluntary assumption of a duty are “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) the injured party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … . …

The municipal defendants’ duty was limited to providing a crossing guard at the intersection of 101st Street and Seaview Avenue, and did not extend to the intersection of 100th Street and Seaview Avenue, where no crossing guard was assigned … . Further, the municipal defendants established, prima facie, that the failure of having a crossing guard at the intersection of 101st Street and Seaview Avenue was not a proximate cause of the injuries allegedly sustained by the infant plaintiff in this case … . …

The municipal defendants also established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the negligent supervision cause of action. Their submissions demonstrated that the accident occurred after the infant plaintiff was dismissed from school … , and that they did not release the infant plaintiff into a foreseeably hazardous setting that they had a hand in creating … . Ade v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05993, Second Dept 8-12-18

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW, STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (MUNICIPAL LAW, STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (NEGLIGENCE, STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (NEGLIGENCE, STUDENT WALKING HOME FROM SCHOOL STRUCK BY A CAR, SUIT AGAINST SCHOOL BOARD AND MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUNICIPALITY, NO DUTY TO SUPERVISE AFTER DISMISSAL FROM SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT))

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LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE... MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS SUPPORTED NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT).