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THE IMMUNITY CONFERRED ON HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS DURING THE COVID PANDEMIC CAN BE BASED ON THE OVERALL STRAIN ON THE OVERWHELMED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM; ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MED MAL CASE MAY DEMONSTRATE ENTITLEMENT TO IMMUNITY AS THE CASE PROGRESSES, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ENTITLEMENT TO IMMUNITY AS A MATTER OF LAW SUCH THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined defendants in this med mal case were not entitled to dismissal of the complaint based upon the immunity conferred by the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (EDPTA) during the COVID pandemic. The plaintiff-patient, who did not have COVID, fell near his hospital bed and suffered a brain injury. After he fell, and before he suffered any symptoms of the injury from the fall, he was examined by two doctors. The doctors were not made aware of the fall. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint at the outset of the case based on the EDPTA, noting that the immunity conferred by the statute was based upon the overall strain placed on the healthcare system by the pandemic. The Second Department determined that, although the defendants may be able to demonstrate their entitlement to immunity as the case progresses, they did not demonstrate entitlement to immunity as a matter of law such that the complaint should be dismissed at the outset:

… [O]f the three conditions imposed by former Public Health Law § 3082(1), there is no question that defendants were arranging for or providing health care services as per the statute, and were doing so in good faith. The parties’ dispute distills to whether defendants established, conclusively, that “the treatment of [plaintiff was] impacted by [defendants’] decisions or activities in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak” (former Public Health Law § 3082[1][b]). * * *

A statute conferring immunity must be strictly construed … , and a party seeking its protections “must conform strictly with its conditions” … . In this regard, we note that only minimal discovery had been conducted at the time the motion was made, and that the applicability of the defense, itself, requires a fact-intensive inquiry. Whether or not defendants may ultimately be able to demonstrate that they are entitled to immunity, it is premature to deem the analysis completed at this juncture … . Holder v Jacob, 2024 NY Slip Op 03864, First Dept 7-18-24

Practice Point: Healthcare providers may be entitled to statutory immunity during the COVID pandemic. Here the defendants were unable to demonstrate entitlement to immunity as a matter of law such that the med mal complaint should be dismissed. But they may be able demonstrate entitlement to immunity as the case progresses.

 

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