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THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POLICE “COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTION;” BUT THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONING WHICH LED TO DEFENDANT’S DWI ARREST WAS “COMMENSURATE WITH ANY PERCEIVED NEED FOR ASSISTANCE;” INDICTMENT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court and dismissing the indictment, determined the statements made to police after a traffic stop, including his refusal to submit to a breath test, should have been suppressed. Defendant was behind the police car when he flashed his lights several times. The police pulled over but defendant just drove past them. The police then followed the defendant, pulled him over and asked why he flashed his lights and whether he was ok. Defendant’s response was not in the record. After it was clear defendant gave the police a phony birth date, he was asked to step out of the car. At that point the police suspected he was intoxicated:

… [T]he Constitution “is not a barrier to a police officer seeking to help someone in immediate danger” … . Deemed the “community caretaking function[ ]” by the United States Supreme Court … , this concept recognizes that police do not just fight crime, but “perform varied public service roles, including protecting citizens from harm” … . The police’s community caretaking function is “‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence’ of criminal conduct” … .

The Court of Appeals has determined that the police may stop an automobile in an exercise of their community caretaking function if two criteria are met. “First, the officers must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that an occupant of the vehicle is in need of assistance. Second, the police intrusion must be narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance. Once assistance has been provided and the peril mitigated, or the perceived need for assistance has been dispelled, any further police action must be justified under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 12 of the State Constitution” … .

​… [T]he People failed to establish … that the police intrusion in this matter was narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance. Upon permissibly stopping the defendant’s vehicle, [Officer} Pavinski appropriately asked the defendant why he had flashed his lights and whether everything was okay. However, there is no evidence as to the defendant’s response to this inquiry. Without such evidence, and in light of [Officer} Spilotros’s testimony that the defendant did not appear to be in distress, the People have not demonstrated that the continued questioning of the defendant was an intrusion “commensurate with [any] perceived need for assistance” … . … [T]here is nothing in the record indicating that the officers had suspicions that the defendant was intoxicated until after they determined that he had lied about his birth date and asked him to exit the vehicle. People v Serrano, 2024 NY Slip Op 03833, Second Dept 7-17-24

Practice Point: The police can stop a vehicle if they believe the driver may be in distress (community caretaking function). But the subsequent questioning of the driver must address the perceived need for assistance and should stop once it is determined no assistance is required.

 

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