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REMOVAL OF THE CHILD FROM MOTHER’S CARE WAS NOT WARRANTED, NO SHOWING OF AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE CHILD’S LIFE OR HEALTH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the child should not have been removed for the mother’s care because there was not showing of an imminent threat to the child’s life or health:

Upon a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1027, “temporary removal is only authorized where the court finds it necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child’s life or health'” … . “In determining a removal application pursuant to Family Court Act § 1027, the court must engage in a balancing test of the imminent risk with the best interests of the child and, where appropriate, the reasonable efforts made to avoid removal or continuing removal'”  … . “Imminent danger, however, must be near or impending, not merely possible” … .

Here, the petitioner failed to establish that the child would be subjected to imminent risk if he were not removed from the mother’s custody pending the outcome of the neglect proceeding … . The Family Court’s concerns about, inter alia, whether the mother would keep in contact with the petitioner or return to court for continued proceedings did not amount to an imminent risk to the child’s life or health that could not be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. Matter of Cameron L. (Ashley L.), 2019 NY Slip Op 09268, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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