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You are here: Home1 / Landlord-Tenant2 / THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SPECIFICALLY TARGETED FOR A HOME INVASION DID...
Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SPECIFICALLY TARGETED FOR A HOME INVASION DID NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING THAT INADEQUATE BUILDING SECURITY WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property owners should not have been awarded summary judgment in this home invasion case. The fact that plaintiff was specifically targeted did not preclude a finding that building security was inadequate:

Plaintiff was the victim of a home invasion of his apartment in a building owned and operated by defendants. The incident began when someone knocked on plaintiff’s apartment door and asked by name for his niece, who also lived in the apartment. When plaintiff looked through the peephole, he thought he saw a young woman, but the peephole was blurry, as it had been since plaintiff had moved in three or four years earlier. Plaintiff also testified that the chain guard on the door did not function properly. When plaintiff opened the door slightly, the young woman and a man he had not seen through the peephole pushed their way into the apartment and pistol whipped him. After demanding $5,000 that had purportedly been sent to plaintiff’s niece, the two assailants assaulted plaintiff for an extended period and looted the apartment before leaving.

Defendants failed to establish their entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint, as evidence that an attack was targeted toward a particular person does not sever the proximate cause link as a matter of law in cases alleging negligent security … . In light of the record evidence that the building’s locks were malfunctioning, and that plaintiff’s apartment peephole and chain lock were defective, proximate cause is for the factfinder to decide … . Cabrera-Perez v Promesa Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 01338, First Dept 3-14-24

Practice Point: The fact that plaintiff was deliberately and specifically targeted for a home invasion did not preclude a finding that malfunctioning locks and a defective peephole constituted a proximate cause of the invasion and consequent injury.

 

March 14, 2024
Tags: First Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-03-14 14:27:042024-03-22 08:31:43THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SPECIFICALLY TARGETED FOR A HOME INVASION DID NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING THAT INADEQUATE BUILDING SECURITY WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE (FIRST DEPT).
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