You are here: / / THE STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE IN CPLR 510(3) WERE...

THE STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE IN CPLR 510(3) WERE NOT MET; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motion to change the venue in this insurance-coverage dispute should not have been granted because the statutory criteria in CPLR 510(3) were not met. The statute requires detailed information about the witnesses who will testify and how those witnesses would be inconvenienced if venue is not changed:

To warrant a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3), “[t]he affidavit in support of such motion must contain the names, addresses and occupations of the prospective witnesses, must disclose the facts to which the proposed witnesses will testify at the trial, must show that the proposed witnesses are, in fact, willing to testify and must show how the proposed witnesses would be inconvenienced in the event that a change of venue is not granted” … . Defendants have failed to meet any part of this standard. Defendants’ general statements that nonparty witnesses involved in the renovation project will be inconvenienced by venue in New York County is inadequate to satisfy the standard … . Corner of Walnut LLC v Tompkins Ins. Agencies, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 01339, First Dept 3-14-24

Practice Point: CPLR 510(3) describes the required contents of a motion to change venue which includes detailed information about the witnesses who will testify and how the witnesses will be inconvenienced if venue is not changed.

 

You might also like
THE APPELLATE COURTS HAVE THE “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” POWER TO REDUCE AN OTHERWISE LEGAL AND APPROPRIATE SENTENCE WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL; HERE THE MAJORITY CHOSE NOT TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE; A STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED FOR A REDUCTION (FIRST DEPT).
MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS AND HER REQUEST FOR RESPITE CARE BECAUSE SHE WAS OVERWHELMED DID NOT SUPPORT A NEGLECT FINDING; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN IMMINENT RISK TO THE CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT).
Loss of Small Portion of Stenographic Record Did Not Require Reversal
Failure of Freezer to Properly Cool Baked Goods Was an “Occurrence” (I.e., “Accident”) within the Meaning of the Commercial General Liability Policy
Cross-Examination About the Omission of Exculpatory Information from a Statement Made to Police Is Not the Same as Cross-Examination About the Exercise of the Right to Remain Silent
FALL OFF BACK OF FLATBED TRUCK WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION.
THE FACT THAT THE POLICE WERE AWARE THE VAN THEY STOPPED HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN INVOLVED IN TWO PRIOR INCIDENTS—(1) A ROAD RAGE SHOOTING AND (2) NEARLY RUNNING OVER A TRAFFIC AGENT ABOUT TO ISSUE A PARKING TICKET—PROVIDED REASONABLE SUSPICION SUPPORTING THE LEVEL THREE TRAFFIC STOP, DESPITE THE FACT THE POLICE DID NOT KNOW WHO WAS DRIVING THE VAN DURING THE PRIOR INCIDENTS (FIRST DEPT). ​
Tenant Entitled to Attorney’s Fees After Successfully Defending Landlord’s Holdover Action—Discretion to Deny Attorney’s Fees Should Be Used Sparingly Because of the Purpose of the Controlling Statute

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF, A NEW YORK RESIDENT AND A SHAREHOLDER IN DEFENDANT LONDON CORPORATION,... THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS SPECIFICALLY TARGETED FOR A HOME INVASION DID NOT...