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A STACK OF DRYWALL LEANING AGAINST A WALL AND PARTIALLY BLOCKING A DOORWAY FELL OVER ON PLAINTIFF’S ANKLE AS PLAINTIFF ATTEMPTED TO MOVE IT; THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying( Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action should not have been dismissed. A stack of drywall leaning against a wall and partially blocking a doorway fell over onto plaintiff’s ankle when plaintiff and another attempted to move it:

Although the drywall that fell on plaintiff was located on the floor and was not being hoisted or secured, issues of fact exist whether section 240 (1) applies to this case … .

… [The] Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action insofar … is premised on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1) … .. Issues of fact exist whether the drywall was stored safely at the construction site and whether the drywall was a material pile that blocked a passageway … . Jesmain v Time Cap Dev. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 01444, Fourth Dept 3-15-24

Practice Point: A stack of drywall which was leaning against the wall and partially blocked a doorway fell over on plaintiff’s ankle when he attempted to move it. That scenario presented issues of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of defendants on the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action.

 

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