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PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED AS UNTIMELY; THE PORTION OF THE UNTIMELY MOTION WHICH HAD BEEN TIMELY RAISED BY ANOTHER DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED; THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY RELIED ON INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS REQUIRING THAT ELECTRICAL POWER BE SHUT DOWN TO PROTECT ELECTRICAL WORKERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this Labor Law 241(6, 200 and common law negligence action, determined; (1) portions of a defendant’s summary judgment motion brought more than a month after the ordered deadline where properly dismissed as untimely; (2) the aspect of the untimely summary judgment motion which had been timely raised in another defendant’s summary judgment motion was properly considered; (3) the industrial code requires shutting down the electricity when worker’s are doing electrical work, therefore plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was in an aerial bucket working on electrical lines when injured in an explosion:

Absent a “satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness,” constituting good cause for the delay, an untimely summary judgment motion must be denied without consideration of the merits … . However, “[a]n untimely motion or cross motion for summary judgment may be considered by the court where a timely motion was made on nearly identical grounds” … . * * *

… [T]he defendants … failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), which was predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.13(b)(3) and (4). 12 NYCRR 23-1.13(b)(3) provides, among other things, that where the performance of the work may bring any person into physical or electrical contact with an electric power circuit, the employer “shall advise his [or her] employees of the locations of such lines, the hazards involved and the protective measures to be taken.” 12 NYCRR 23-1.13(b)(4) requires, in pertinent part, that employees who may come into contact with an electric power circuit be protected against electric shock “by de-energizing the circuit and grounding it or by guarding such circuit by effective insulation or other means” … . These regulations, which refer to the duty of employers, also impose a duty upon owners … . Wittenberg v Long Is. Power Auth., 2024 NY Slip Op 01329

Practice Point: A summary judgment motion brought a month after the ordered deadline may be dismissed as untimely.

Practice Point: A portion of an untimely summary judgment motion which was timely raised by another defendant may be considered.

Practice Point: The industrial code provisions requiring that electrical power be shut down to protect electrical workers supported plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) cause of action.

 

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