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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION EXPLAINED, PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS NOTED.

The Second Department, in a lawsuit stemming from the flooding of plaintiffs’ land, explained the differences between contribution and indemnification and noted that corporate officers may be personally liable for torts committed in their performance of corporate duties:

The plaintiffs commenced this action against the Village of East Hills after they experienced flooding on their property from rainwater. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action sounding in tort, alleging that the flooding resulted from the development of land near their property, which was authorized by the Village. The Village commenced a third-party action seeking indemnification and contribution against A to Z Transit Contracting Corp., the project manager that constructed the plaintiffs’ home, as well as its principal, David Ferdinand, architect Carl Majowka, who prepared plans for the construction of the plaintiffs’ home, and Scott Anderson, the principal of Scott Anderson Design, Inc., which performed landscaping work for the plaintiffs’ home. * * *

“[C]ontribution arises automatically when certain factors are present and [does] not requir[e] any kind of agreement between or among the wrongdoers'” … . ” Indemnity, on the other hand, arises out of a contract which may be express or may be implied in law “to prevent a result which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory”‘” … . “Further, “[w]here one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principles apply to shift the entire liability to the one who was negligent.” . . . Conversely, where a party is held liable at least partially because of its own negligence, contribution against other culpable tort-feasors is the only available remedy'”… . “Whether indemnity or contribution applies depends not upon the parties’ designation but upon a careful analysis of the theory of recovery against each tort-feasor'”       * * *

Although “[c]orporate officers may not be held personally liable on contracts of their corporations, provided they did not purport to bind themselves individually under such contracts” … , “corporate officers may be held personally liable for torts committed in the performance of their corporate duties'” … . Eisman v Village of E. Hills. 2017 NY Slip Op 02775, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

NEGLIGENCE (DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION EXPLAINED, PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS NOTED)/CONTRACT LAW (DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION EXPLAINED, PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS NOTED)/CORPORATION LAW  (DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION EXPLAINED, PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS NOTED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION EXPLAINED, PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS NOTED)

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APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE LACK... DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PODIATRIC MALPRACTICE...