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THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO CORRECT A TYPO SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (LABOR LAW 241 AND 241(B) RATHER THAN 240(1)); SUMMARY JUDGMENT CAN BE GRANTED ON AN UNPLEADED CAUSE OF ACTION; HERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE FOUR-INCH ELEVATION DIFFERENTIAL WAS DE MINIMIS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to amend the complaint to correct a typographical error should have been granted and noted that a motion for summary judgment can be granted on an unpleaded cause of action. The complaint alleged violation of Labor Law 241 and 241 (b) instead of Labor Law 240(1). The Second Department went on to find that plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because there was a question of fact whether the accident was an “elevation-related” event–a cylinder had dropped four inches and injured plaintiff’s finger. The question of fact concerned whether the four-inch height differential was de minimis:

… [T]he proposed amendment corrected a typographical error, did not result in any prejudice or surprise to the defendants, and was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit … . 

We note that, despite the fact that the plaintiff had not yet properly pleaded a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action at the time that he made a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), “summary judgment may be awarded on an unpleaded cause of action if the proof supports such cause and if the opposing party has not been misled to its prejudice” … . * * *

The plaintiff failed to meet his prima facie burden, as he did not prove, as a matter of law, that he sustained the type of elevation-related injury that Labor Law § 240(1) was intended to protect against. Namely, where the cylinder fell only four inches but did so with such force as to crush the plaintiff’s finger, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the elevation differential between the plaintiff and the falling object was de minimis … . Castillo v Hawke Enters., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06505, Second Dept 12-20-23

Practice Point: The motion to amend the complaint to correct a typo should have been granted.

Practice Point: Where the facts support it, a summary judgment motion may be based on an unpleaded cause of action.

Practice Point: Here a cylinder dropped four inches, injuring plaintiff’s finger. There was a question of fact whether the elevation-differential was de minimis.

 

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