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INFANT PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF FALLING BECAUSE OF PEBBLES AND WET GRASS ON THE SOCCER FIELD (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined infant plaintiff assumed the risk of falling in a school pick-up soccer game. Plaintiff alleged he fell because of pebbles and wet grass on the playing field:

The infant plaintiff testified that he fell because of a combination of, among other things, pebbles on the field and wet and muddy grass. The infant plaintiff further testified that there were no puddles, and the grass was wet from the previous day’s rain and other students playing with water balloons on the field. However, neither the pebbles nor the wet grass described in this case presented a concealed or unreasonably increased risk beyond those inherent in the activity of outdoor soccer … , regardless of whether the wet grass was caused by rain or water balloons … . Furthermore, merely allowing children to play on a field with pebbles and wet grass does not constitute negligent supervision … .   To hold otherwise would effectively prohibit schools from utilizing outdoor playing fields … . C.P.G. v Uniondale Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 06512, Second Dept 12-20-23

Practice Point: Here the infant plaintiff assumed the risk of falling because of pebbles and wet grass on the soccer playing field.

 

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