You are here: / / Question of Fact Whether Structure on a Sports Field (Pole Vault Box) Was...
,

Question of Fact Whether Structure on a Sports Field (Pole Vault Box) Was Open and Obvious Such that No Protection or Warning Was Required for Pedestrians

The Second Department determined a question of fact had been raised about whether the school district had a duty to protect or warn pedestrians concerning a “pole vault box” on a sports field.  Plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell over the box. Plaintiff thought she was using a walkway but she was on the pole vault runway:

To impose liability upon a defendant in a trip-and-fall action, there must be evidence that a dangerous or defective condition existed, and that the defendant either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it … . A defendant has no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition, which as a matter of law is not inherently dangerous … . The issue of whether a dangerous condition is open and obvious is fact specific, and thus usually a question for the jury … . Whether an asserted hazard is open and obvious cannot be divorced from the surrounding circumstances … . A condition that is ordinarily apparent to a person making reasonable use of his or her senses may be rendered a trap for the unwary where the condition is obscured or the plaintiff is distracted … .

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant submitted sufficient evidence to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the pole vault box was not inherently dangerous and was readily observable to individuals employing the reasonable use of their senses … .

In opposition, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the condition, while open and obvious, constituted a trap for the unwary. In this regard, the plaintiff submitted photographs of the pole vault area and the affidavit of the injured plaintiff, wherein she stated that she had never been to this area of the athletic fields of the high school before, believed she was walking on a walkway, and was speaking to her daughter trying to determine which field to go to … . Julianne Oldham-Powers v Longwood Cent School Dist, 2014 NY Slip Op 08411, 2nd Dept 12-3-14

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE VILLAGE CODE MADE THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE SIDEWALK, THE CODE DID NOT IMPOSE TORT LIABILITY ON THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER; THE PROPERTY OWNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISCHARGING THE MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FORECLOSURE STARTED WHEN THE DEBT WAS ACCELERATED BY THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WHICH WAS ULTIMATELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED BY A DRIVER WHO WAS BEING PURSUED BY THE POLICE; THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTERNAL RULES IMPOSED A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE FOR POLICE-CHASES THAN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THE INTERNAL RULES COULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY AS SOME EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE; PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
A CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 WHICH DOES NOT STATE THE FAILURE TO FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE WITHIN 90 DAYS WOULD BE THE BASIS OF A MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IS INEFFECTIVE AND CAN BE VACATED (SECOND DEPT).
BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED AT JFK AIRPORT, OWNED BY THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NY & NJ, BY A FORKLIFT WHICH WAS BACKING UP; THE FACT THAT REAR-VIEW MIRRORS WERE OPTIONAL WAS NOT A DESIGN DEFECT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED; THE PORT AUTHORITY WAS IMMUNE FROM A NEGLIGENCE ACTION ALLEGING FAILURE TO INSPECT THE FORKLIFT, CRITERIA EXLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
RESPONDENT MATERNAL UNCLE IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING DID NOT EFFECTIVELY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; ORDER REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
OFFICER DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VAN AFTER HE LEARNED THAT DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SITTING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT, WAS SMOKING A CIGAR, NOT MARIJUANA, SUPREME COURT’S SUA SPONTE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH WAS ERROR, THERE WAS UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THE VAN WAS DEFENDANT’S WORK VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Operative Principles Re: a Collision Where Plaintiff Has the Right-of-Way E... Wood Which Fell From a Shelf When Plaintiff Inadvertently Moved It Was the Condition...