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THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP) ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) proceeding, determined that the criteria for dismissal of counterclaims are those in the Civil Rights Law, not the CPLR:

In this Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) action, the court’ s application of CPLR 3212(h) to the underlying summary judgment motion was improper, because the counterclaims “subject to the motion” were not SLAPP claims, but affirmative counterclaims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees … .The award of attorneys’ fees and punitive damages in SLAPP actions are subject to their own statutory regime found in Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a (anti-SLAPP statutes). The anti-SLAPP statutes contain their own requirements and evidentiary burdens that have nothing to do with CPLR 3212(h) … .

With respect to punitive damages, Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(c) provides that they may only be recovered upon “an additional demonstration” that the SLAPP action was commenced or continued for the sole purpose of “harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition or association rights.” Thus, when the court improperly applied the burden-shifting mechanism of 3212(h) to the punitive damages analysis, it effectively negated the requirement that defendants make this “additional demonstration.” …

With respect to attorneys’ fees, the pre-amendment version of Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a) squarely put the burden of proof on the party advancing counterclaims to recover damages in the context of a SLAPP suit. As the November 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes do not apply retroactively, this pre-amendment version of the statute applies … .

The pre-amendment version of Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a) provided that “attorney’s fees may be recovered upon a demonstration . . . that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law.” Courts have held that attorneys’ fees are discretionary under the pre-amendment statutory framework, and that it is not necessary to award attorneys’ fees “in every situation in which [an anti-SLAPP] claim is interposed” … . … [W]e find that the court providently exercised its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees here … . 161 Ludlow Food, LLC v L.E.S. Dwellers, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 06076, First Dept 11-28-23

Practice Point: The analysis of counterclaims for attorney’s fees and punitive damages in a SLAPP action is controlled by the Civil Rights Law, not the CPLR.

 

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