You are here: / / ​ A VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION NO LONGER STOPS T...
,

​ A VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION NO LONGER STOPS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that a voluntary discontinuance of a foreclosure action no longer stops the running of the statute of limitations:

… [T]he six-year statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt in July 2011, when the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest commenced the 2011 action and elected to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage … . The instant action was commenced in October 2017, more than six years later (see CPLR 213[4] …). Under the recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821, § 8 [eff Dec. 30, 2022]), the voluntary discontinuance of the 2011 action did not “in form or effect, waive, postpone, cancel, toll, extend, revive or reset the limitations period to commence an action and to interpose a claim, unless expressly prescribed by statute” (CPLR 3217[e]; see CPLR 203[h] … ). Under these new legal principles, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the voluntary discontinuance of the 2011 action to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether enforcement of the mortgage loan is barred by the statute of limitations. CIT Bank, N.A. v Byers, 2023 NY Slip Op 04978, Second Dept 10-4-23

Practice Point: Pursuant to the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (2022) the bank can no longer stop the running of the statute of limitations by voluntarily discontinuing the foreclosure action.

 

You might also like
THE JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE THREE-STEP PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING A BATSON CHALLENGE; THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE THAT THE PEOPLE’S PURPORTED RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR ELIMINATING A PROSPECTIVE HISPANIC JUROR WERE PRETEXTUAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS REQUESTED GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE WHICH WAS PROCURED BY THE BROKER; THE BROKER WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY TO ADVISE, GUIDE OR DIRECT PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COVERAGE (SECOND DEPT).
FATHER ALLEGED CHANGES IN HIS WORK SCHEDULE ALLOWED MORE TIME FOR PARENTAL ACCESS WITH THE CHILD; A HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED ON FATHER’S MODIFICATION PETITION (SECOND DEPT).
WIFE ENTITLED TO SHARE OF HUSBAND’S SEPARATE PROPERTY WHICH WAS COMMINGLED WITH MARITAL FUNDS, WIFE ALSO ENTITLED TO SHARE OF APPRECIATION OF HUSBAND’S SEPARATE PROPERTY.
THE DESTRUCTION OF VIDEO EVIDENCE OF THE SLIP AND FALL WARRANTED A SANCTION; HOWEVER, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO PRECLUDE THE DEFENSE FROM PRESENTING ANY EVIDENCE RE: LIABILITY; AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE WITH RESPECT TO THE VIDEO EVIDENCE IS AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
Subcontractor Which Does Not Supervise or Control Injured Worker May Be Liable Under Common Law Negligence Where It Creates an Unreasonable Risk of Harm
PETITIONER, A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER UNDER POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, CAN BE PLACED IN RESIDENTIAL CORRECTIONS FACILITIES PENDING THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNITY HOUSING THAT IS MORE THAN 1000 FEET FROM A SCHOOL (SECOND DEPT).
UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS ADMITTED WITH COVID, WAS TREATED... DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO A RISK-ASSESSMENT THEORY...