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Absence of 90-Day Demand to Serve a Note of Issue Precluded Dismissal of Lawsuit Based on Gross Laches (12-Year Delay)

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, the Second Department determined that the doctrine of laches was not available to dismiss a pre-note-of-issue case which had been dormant for 12 years.  In this slip and fall case, the incident occurred in 1992, issue was joined, plaintiffs served a bill of particulars, but plaintiffs failed to appear at a June 1996 status conference. The action was “marked off” the calendar and later marked “disposed.”  In October, 2008, the plaintiffs moved restore the action to the active pre-note-of-issue calendar. Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss based on laches “concluding that it lacked the power to dismiss the … complaint.”  The Second Department affirmed, explaining:

At the outset, we note that we summarized the law applicable to the issue in this case in Lopez v Imperial Delivery Serv. (282 AD2d 190), where we explained the interplay among three case management devices: CPLR 3404, 22 NYCRR 202.27, and CPLR 3216. In Lopez, we made clear that none of these devices applies to a pre-note-of-issue case where, as here, there has been no order dismissing the complaint pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, and the defendant has never made a 90-day written demand on the plaintiff to serve and file a note of issue pursuant to CPLR 3216… . In this case, the [defendant] attempts to avoid the holding in Lopez by relying on the doctrine of laches as the basis for dismissing the complaint. * * *

…[T]he Court of Appeals concluded in Airmont Homes that dismissal for either gross laches or failure to prosecute was not available in the absence of compliance with CPLR 3216 (see Airmont Homes v Town of Ramapo, 69 NY2d at 902). To allow dismissal under the circumstances of this case based on the doctrine of laches would be tantamount to permitting dismissal for general delay, which the courts lack inherent authority to do, and which is inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying CPLR 3216 [which requires a 90-day demand to serve and file a note of issue]. …

Although an extensive delay in prosecuting an action may, at times, prejudice a defendant’s ability to defend against a suit, a defendant has the statutory means of avoiding such prejudicial delay by serving a 90-day demand … . Laches, which is an equitable doctrine, does not provide an alternate route to dismissal where a defendant has not served the 90-day demand statutorily required to prompt resumption of the litigation … .  Arroyo v Board of Educ of City of NY, 2013 NY Slip Op 05507, 2nd Dept 7-31-13

 

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