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Labor Law 241(6) Action Should Not Have Been Dismissed/Power Washing Was Integral to the Painting Process and Was Not “Routine Maintenance”

The Second Department determined the Labor Law 241(6) action should not have been dismissed because the work plaintiff was doing, power-washing a building in preparation for painting, was not “routine maintenance,” but rather was an integral part of the painting process:

The defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since they did not demonstrate that the plaintiff, who was injured while power washing buildings in preparation for painting them, was not engaged in a specifically enumerated activity under 12 NYCRR 23-1.4(b)(13). Painting is an activity enumerated under that provision …, and the power washing performed here … was in preparation for, and a contractual part of, the painting work. Accordingly, the power washing did not constitute “routine maintenance” excluded from the ambit of Labor Law § 241(6), but rather, constituted surface preparation, an integral part of the painting process contemplated by the parties.  Dixson v Waterways at Bay Pointe Home Owners Assn Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 08591, 2nd Dept 12-26-13

 

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