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THE WASHINGTON DC ATTEMPT TO COMMIT ROBBERY CONVICTION COULD NOT BE THE BASIS OF A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a Washington DC offense could not be the basis of a second felony offender adjudication. Although the issue was not preserved, the court exercised its interest of justice jurisdiction:

… [T]he defendant’s conviction of attempt to commit robbery in Washington, D.C., cannot be used as a predicate felony in New York (see People v Jurgins, 26 NY3d 607, 614-615; see also Penal Law §§ 70.06[1][b][i]; 160.00, 110.00; DC Code §§ 22-2801, 22-2802). Accordingly, we modify the judgment by vacating the defendant’s adjudication as a second felony offender and the sentence imposed thereon, and we remit the matter … for resentencing. People v Blaker, 2023 NY Slip Op 03472, Second Dept 6-28-23

Practice Point: The Washington DC attempt to commit robbery conviction could not be the basis for a second felony offender adjudication in New York.

 

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