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Where Extrinsic Evidence Indicates a Party’s Interpretation of Ambiguous Language Is the Only Fair Interpretation, Summary Judgment Is Appropriate

In finding that the meaning of a title insurance policy was properly determined as a matter of law, the Second Department explained the complicated analytical criteria:

Generally, courts determine the rights and obligations of parties under insurance contracts based on the specific language of the policies … . However, where the language is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, and thus ambiguous, “the parties to the policy may, as an aid in construction, submit extrinsic evidence of their intent at the time of contracting” … . “[I]f the tendered extrinsic evidence is itself conclusory and will not resolve the equivocality of the language of the contract, the issue remains a question of law for the court” … . “Under those circumstances, the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer which drafted the contract” … .

“It is only where such evidence does not resolve the equivocality that the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer” … . Where there is ambiguity and the “determination of the intent of the parties depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence, then such determination is to be made by the jury” … . Where, however, a party’s extrinsic evidence demonstrates “not only that its interpretation is reasonable but that it is the only fair interpretation,” summary judgment is appropriate … . Demetrio v Stewart Tit Ins Co, 2015 NY Slip Op 00720, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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