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WHERE DEFENDANTS AVER SPECIFIC FACTS WHICH REBUT THE STATEMENTS IN THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IS REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants presented sufficient facts to rebut the presumption they were properly served with the summons and complaint, requiring a hearing:

“Ordinarily, the affidavit of a process server constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant was validly served” … Bare and unsubstantiated denials of receipt of the summons and complaint are insufficient to rebut the presumption of service … . “However, a sworn denial of service containing specific facts generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server’s affidavit, and necessitates an evidentiary hearing” … . “If an issue regarding service turns upon a question of credibility, a hearing should be held to render a determination on this issue”… .

Here, the process servers’ affidavits of service constituted prima facie evidence of valid service upon the defendants at the subject New York and Florida properties … . However, since the defendants’ sworn denial of receipt of process at both properties contained specific facts to rebut the statements in the process servers’ affidavits, the presumption of proper service was rebutted and an evidentiary hearing was required … . Aikens v Kouchnerova, 2023 NY Slip Op 03218, Second Dept 6-14-23

Practice Point: A defendant’s mere denial of receipt of a summons and complaint is not enough to rebut the presumption of valid service. But where a defendant avers specific facts which rebut the statements in the process server’s affidavit, an evidentiary hearing is required.

 

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