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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED, SUA SPONTE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY ANY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, denied plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of foreclosure on a ground not raised by the parties:

… [T]he Supreme Court should not have denied its motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale upon finding that DLJ [plaintiff] failed to show that the defendants were properly served. The defendants did not oppose DLJ’s motion on any ground, including lack of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the court should not have, sua sponte, raised the issue of the propriety of service …

Moreover, DLJ demonstrated its entitlement to a judgment of foreclosure and sale by submitting evidence establishing the merits of its unopposed motion and the referee’s findings and report … . DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v Ramnarine, 2019 NY Slip Op 08392, Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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