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ALTHOUGH CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WAS PRECLUDED BY THE ARBITRATION AWARD, TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED, THE TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT SUBJECT TO THE ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BE GRANTED ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT WHO DID NOT MOVE FOR DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined, among other things, the arbitration of the breach contract claim did not preclude tort actions against the school defendants by a former student and his parents. The Second Department further determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed causes of action against the school on grounds not raised by the parties, should not have dismissed causes of action against a party which did not move for dismissal, and the four-month Article 78 statute of limitations, which usually applies to actions against schools, did not apply to the tort causes of action raised here. The allegations included bullying and an improper relationship between the student and certain defendants:

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On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” … . The complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations must be accepted as true … . Broadly construed, the allegations, inter alia, of an “inappropriate relationship” between the plaintiff’s son and Stowell, an instructor or teacher at Knox School, the allegations of multiple communications from Stowell to the son around the time of his temporary “disappearance” from school and home in late 2012, and the allegations that Stowell refused to cooperate with a police investigation, suffice to state causes of action sounding in negligence … , intentional infliction of emotional distress … , and negligent infliction of emotional distress … . Cheslowitz v Board of Trustees of the Knox Sch., 2017 NY Slip Op 08807, Second Dept 12-20-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WAS PRECLUDED BY THE ARBITRATION AWARD, TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED, THE TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE SUBJECT TO THE STANDARD TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT THE ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BE GRANTED ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT WHO DID NOT MOVE FOR DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, ALTHOUGH CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WAS PRECLUDED BY THE ARBITRATION AWARD, TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED, THE TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE SUBJECT TO THE STANDARD TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT THE ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BE GRANTED ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT WHO DID NOT MOVE FOR DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (ALTHOUGH CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WAS PRECLUDED BY THE ARBITRATION AWARD, TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED, THE TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE SUBJECT TO THE STANDARD TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT THE ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BE GRANTED ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT WHO DID NOT MOVE FOR DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3211 (a)(7)  (ALTHOUGH CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WAS PRECLUDED BY THE ARBITRATION AWARD, TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED, THE TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE SCHOOL DEFENDANTS WERE SUBJECT TO THE STANDARD TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT THE ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BE GRANTED ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES, DISMISSAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT WHO DID NOT MOVE FOR DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT))

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