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PLAINTIFF’S INJURY DID NOT INVOLVE THE TYPE OF ELEVATION HAZARD CONTEMPLATED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT EXERCISE A LEVEL OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s injury did not involve the type of elevation hazard covered by Labor Law 240 (1) and defendants  did not exercise the level of supervisory control necessary for liability under Labor Law 200:

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when a metal plate, which was used to cover an excavated trench located on the roadway, struck the plaintiff as it was being removed from the roadway surface. * * *

… [T]he defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action by their submissions, which demonstrated that they only had general supervisory authority over the plaintiff’s work … . …

“The contemplated hazards [of Labor Law § 240(1)] are those related to the effects of gravity where protective devices are called for either because of a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level or a difference between the elevation level where the worker is positioned and the higher level of the materials or load being hoisted or secured” … . The defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s injury did not result from the type of elevation-related hazard contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1) … . Lombardi v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 06763, Second Dept 9-25-19

 

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