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A JUDGE MAY NOT ORDER THAT ONLY THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD (AFC), AND NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, IS ALLOWED TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF SURRENDER OR ADOPTION WITH THE CHILD; SUCH AN ORDER INTERFERES WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S STATUTORY DUTIES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court in a matter of first impression in this neglect proceeding, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined Family Court could not order the petitioner (Delaware County Department of Social Services) to refrain from discussing matters of surrender or adoption with the child. The attorney for the child (AFC) requested the order which allowed only the AFC to discuss surrender or adoption with the child. The Third Department heard the case as an exception to the mootness doctrine (the order had been vacated, but the issue is likely to recur). The Third Department concluded the order could not stand because it interfered with the petitioner’s statutory duties:

Although we recognize that circumstances may arise where it may be appropriate to allow an attorney for children reasonable time to discuss sensitive matters of importance, such as adoption or surrender, with their child-client before anyone else does, Family Court’s order was not a temporal arrangement to allow the AFC an opportunity to broach the issue with the child. Instead, the order was an outright ban on anyone, including petitioner’s caseworkers, having a discussion with the child regarding issues that are central to the child’s permanency (see Family Ct Act § 1089 [c] [1] [ii]).

Although Family Court attempted to differentiate the issues of surrender and adoption as “a legal issue distinguishable from the assessment of the child’s well-being,” the court construed the issues pertaining to the child’s well-being too narrowly, leaving petitioner in an untenable situation…. According to petitioner, for over a year, it was prevented “from speaking with the child to reassess its understanding of the child’s wishes” relative to respondent’s possible conditional surrender and a subsequent adoption of the child — issues that fall squarely into the category of permanency decisions. Although the child has a right to meaningful representation and to learn about legal issues from the AFC (see Family Ct Act § 241 …), attorneys for children cannot transform such responsibility into a roadblock, as occurred here, preventing petitioner from fulfilling its mandates and planning for the child’s permanency and well-being … . Matter of Michael H. (Catherine I.), 2023 NY Slip Op 01119, Third Dept 3-2-23

Practice Point: Family Court can not order the Department of Social Services to refrain from discussing matters of surrender or adoption with the child. Here the attorney for the child (AFC) asked Family Court for the order allowing only the AFC to discuss surrender or adoption with the child and the request was granted.

 

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