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THE JUDGE CANNOT, SUA SPONTE, DIRECT ARBITRATION WITHOUT A REQUEST FROM A PARTY; NON-SIGNATORIES TO AN AGREEMENT CONTAINING A FORUM SELECTION PROVISION MAY BE BOUND BY THE PROVISION IF THEY ARE SIGNATORIES TO A RELATED AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, interpreted jurisdiction, forum selection and arbitration provisions in the subject agreements. The decision is fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here. The court summarized its rulings as follows:

This appeal presents novel questions related to jurisdiction, as well as arbitration and forum selection provisions in agreements. The first question is whether, upon reviewing an agreement and determining that an arbitration provision governs, a court should, sua sponte, direct the parties to arbitrate. We hold that a court should not direct parties to arbitrate absent a request from one of the parties.

The second question requires us to examine the circumstances under which non-signatories to an agreement containing a forum selection provision may be bound by that provision consistent with due process. We hold that non-signatories to an agreement may be bound by that agreement’s forum selection provision when they are signatories to a related agreement, which forms part of the same transaction, and are closely related to both the transaction and one of the signatories to the agreement containing the forum selection provision. P.S. Fin., LLC v Eureka Woodworks, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 00877, Second Dept 2-15-23

Practice Point: A judge should not, sua sponte, direct parties to arbitrate pursuant to an agreement absent a request from a party.

Practice Point: Non-signatories may be bound by a forum selection provision in an agreement if they are signatories to a related agreement.

 

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