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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR RESENTENCING WHICH ALLEGED SHE WAS THE VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on her motion for resentencing which alleged she was a victim of domestic violence at the time of the commission of the crime:

Provided that the defendant meets certain threshold eligibility requirements pertaining to, inter alia, the length of incarceration and the type of offense … , a defendant may move for resentencing in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12 (see CPL 440.47[1][c]). The motion itself … must make a preliminary evidentiary showing consisting of “at least two pieces of evidence corroborating the applicant’s claim that he or she was, at the time of the offense, a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the applicant as such term is defined in” CPL 530.11(1) (CPL 440.47[2][c]). Furthermore, “[a]t least one piece of evidence must be either a court record, presentence report, social services record, hospital record, sworn statement from a witness to the domestic violence, law enforcement record, domestic incident report, or order of protection” … .

Here, the defendant’s evidence in support of her motion included affidavits of her sister and mother, as well as a purported transcription of her interrogation by the police. Together, this evidence corroborated her allegations that she was subjected to domestic violence by the codefendant at the time of the offense … , and that the defendant and the codefendant were “member[s] of the same family or household” … . People v Coles, 2022 NY Slip Op 00678, Second Dept 2-2-22

 

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