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THE FIRE DEPARTMENT BOARD OF WARDENS SHOULD NOT HAVE REMOVED A FIREFIGHTER FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THE VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 209-L (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the Blue Point Fire Department Board of Wardens’ removal from membership of a volunteer firefighter, determined the firefighter should have been afforded a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law 209-L:

“Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 209-l, volunteer firefighters cannot be removed from office or membership for incompetence or misconduct, except for absenteeism at fires or meetings, unless they are afforded a hearing” … . However, “[t]hat section, by its own terms, does not affect the right of members of any fire company to remove a volunteer officer or voluntary member of such company for failure to comply with the constitution and by-laws of such company” … .

Here, after a meeting at which the petitioner appeared, the Board of Wardens found that he had violated Article V, Section 1(C), of the bylaws, by donating department property in contravention of an order from the chief of the department. That provision of the bylaws authorized the chief of the department to suspend members of the department for insubordination, refusal to follow orders, and for conduct unbecoming or detrimental to the department, and required the Board of Wardens to review such suspensions. The bylaws did not empower the Board of Wardens to dismiss a member based on a violation of Article V, Section 1(C). Thus, a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 209-l was required … . Matter of McDowell v Blue Point Fire Dept., 2020 NY Slip Op 06793, Second Dept 11-18-20

 

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