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THE LESSEE OF THE PROPERTY, INFOR, CONTRACTED FOR THE WORK BEING DONE AT THE TIME OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURY IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION; THEREFORE INFOR WAS AN “OWNER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LABOR LAW AND WAS A PROPER DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the lessee of the property (Infor) was a proper party in this Labor Law 240(1) action because it had contracted for the work done at the time of plaintiff’s injury:

Plaintiff claims he was drilling metal tracks onto a wall when the Baker scaffold on which he was standing overturned, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. 635 owned the building in which plaintiff was working, and defendant SL Green Realty Corp. (SL Green) was 635’s managing agent. Infor leased the premises from 635, and retained JRM as the general contractor to perform construction work. JRM, in turn, retained Montec and nonparty Premier Builders, Inc., plaintiff’s employer, as subcontractors to perform various aspects of the work. * * *

The Labor Law § 240(1) claim should be reinstated against Infor, as the court incorrectly concluded that Infor was not a proper Labor Law defendant. Although Infor leased the premises from 635, it may still be held liable as an “owner” under the statute because it contracted for the construction work being performed at the time of plaintiff’s accident … . For the same reasons that plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment against 635 and JMR, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim against Infor should be granted, and Infor’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim against it should be denied. Otero v 635 Owner LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 06172, First Dept 11-3-22

Practice Point: A lessee may be considered a property “owner” in a Labor Law 240(1) action when the lessee contracted for the work being done when the plaintiff was injured.

 

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