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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT, UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, HAVE A DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW FROM THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL, SINCE DEFENDANT UNDERTOOK TO DO SO IT MUST DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR EXACERBATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this ice and snow slip and fall case was properly denied. Although the defendant, under the administrative code of NYC, did not have a duty to remove ice and snow from the site of the fall, it did undertake to do so. Therefore, to be entitled to summary judgment, the defendant must present proof it did not create or exacerbate the dangerous condition:

… [Defendant] failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it did not cause, create, or exacerbate the icy condition after it undertook to clean the sidewalk during the winter storm. Neither the testimony of the property’s caretaker nor the affidavit of the supervisor of caretakers’s indicates that they inspected the location before the accident and saw that it was properly treated with salt or sand … . Maynard-Keeler v New York City Hous. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 03322, First Dept 5-8-18

​NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT, UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, HAVE A DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW FROM THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL, SINCE DEFENDANT UNDERTOOK TO DO SO IT MUST DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR EXACERBATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL ( ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT, UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, HAVE A DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW FROM THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL, SINCE DEFENDANT UNDERTOOK TO DO SO IT MUST DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR EXACERBATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (SLIP AND FALL, ICE AND SNOW, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT, UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, HAVE A DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW FROM THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL, SINCE DEFENDANT UNDERTOOK TO DO SO IT MUST DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR EXACERBATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/ICE AND SNOW (SLIP AND FALL,  ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT, UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, HAVE A DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW FROM THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL, SINCE DEFENDANT UNDERTOOK TO DO SO IT MUST DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR EXACERBATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))

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