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THE LETTER OF ENGAGEMENT SPELLED OUT WHAT THE ATTORNEYS AGREED TO DO, DEFENDANT-ATTORNEYS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department found that the retainer agreement determined the scope of what the attorneys agreed to do and the motion to dismiss the legal malpractice complaint was properly granted. The plaintiff had retained the defendants after he was expelled form the New York College of Osteopathic Medicine:

The letter of engagement provided, in relevant part, that: “Our services will include all activities necessary and appropriate in our judgment to investigate and consider options that may be available to urge administrative reconsideration of your dismissal from the New York College of Osteopathic Medicine (the College’). This engagement does not, however, encompass any form of litigation or, to the extent ethically prohibited in this circumstance, the threat of litigation, to resolve this matter. This engagement will end upon your re-admittance to the College or upon a determination by the attorneys working on this matter that no non-litigation mechanisms are available to assist you. The scope of the engagement may not be expanded orally or by conduct; it may only be expanded by a writing signed by our Director of Public Service.” * * *

An attorney may not be held liable for failing to act outside the scope of a retainer (see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428). Therefore, since the defendant’s alleged failure to negotiate with the school, its alleged failure to commence litigation against the school, and its alleged failure to properly advise the plaintiff on the efficacy of a defamation action against nonschool parties fell outside the scope of the parties’ letter of engagement, dismissal of the cause of action alleging legal malpractice was warranted, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), on documentary evidence grounds. Attallah v Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP,  2019 NY Slip Op 00583, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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