You are here: / / PLAINTIFF SERVED THE COMPLAINT ON NOVEMBER 27, 2018; DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED...
, ,

PLAINTIFF SERVED THE COMPLAINT ON NOVEMBER 27, 2018; DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO SERVE AN ANSWER, WHICH WAS REJECTED, ON JANUARY 9, 2019; DEFENDANT’S EXCUSE WAS “THE DELAY WAS CAUSED BY THE INSURANCE CARRIER;” THAT EXCUSE WAS INSUFFICIENT AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE ANSWER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant did not offer a reasonable excuse for serving a late answer (which was rejected) in this slip and fall case. Therefore, defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to accept the answer should not have been granted. Defendant was served with the complaint on November 27, 2018, and defendant attempted to serve the answer on January 9, 2019:

The bare allegation by the defendant’s attorney that the delay was caused by the defendant’s insurance carrier is insufficient to excuse the delay in answering the complaint … . The absence of a reasonable excuse for the defendant’s default renders it unnecessary to determine whether she demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense … . Goldstein v Ilaz, 2022 NY Slip Op 04154, Second Dept 6-29-22

Practice Point: Here the defendant attempted to serve an answer, which was rejected, about a month and a half after plaintiff served the complaint. Defendant moved to compel the plaintiff to accept the answer. Defendant’s excuse was that the “delay was caused by the insurance carrier” with no further explanation. The Second Department deemed the excuse insufficient and ruled that the motion to compel acceptance of the answer should not have been granted.

 

You might also like
IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 ACTION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AN OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY A FALLING OBJECT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE SEARCH WARRANT DESCRIBED THE RESIDENCE AS HAVING TWO ENTRANCE DOORS, ONE LEADING TO THE AREA WHERE THE INFORMANT SAW THE FIREARMS AND ONE LEADING TO A STAIRWAY TO THE SECOND FLOOR (WHICH THE INFORMANT HAD NOT VISITED), THE WARRANT WAS NOT SEVERABLE AND WAS THEREFORE OVERBROAD (SECOND DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS, RESIDENTS OF ISRAEL, HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF A NEW YORK LAWSUIT, THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT INDICATES DUE DILIGENCE IN A FAILED ATTEMPT TO SERVE DEFENDANTS AT A NEW YORK ADDRESS, BECAUSE DEFENDANTS WERE NEVER SERVED, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT). ​
A MONETARY PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY, AS OPPOSED TO DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS (CUPID AND ROBINSON) DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT AND HIS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF CUPID, NOT PLAINTIFF ROBINSON, WAS DRIVING THE CAR DID NOT CREATE A RELEVANT QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
THE RECORD DOES NOT REFLECT THAT MOTHER IN THIS CHILD-SUPPORT PROCEEDING WAS INFORMED OF HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL, HER RIGHT TO AN ADJOURNMENT TO RETAIN COUNSEL, OR HER WAIVER OF THAT RIGHT; NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
“Sua Sponte” Dismissal of Complaint Based on Lack of Standing Reversed

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTHER’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE... PLAINTIFF’S TWO SEPARATE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS SHOULD BE TRIED TOGETHER BECAUSE...