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Motion to Intervene by Members of a De-Certified Class Should Have Been Granted—Class Members Allowed to Sue In Their Individual Capacities

The Second Department determined the motion to intervene by plaintiffs and 167 residents in a de-certified class action alleging environmental damage resulting from emissions from defendant’s (BNL’s) lab should have been granted. The action began as a class action suit which was dismissed without prejudice. Then, in accordance with CPLR 1013, the individuals in the class brought a motion to intervene accompanied by a complaint which was denied by Supreme Court.  The Second Department held the motion to intervene should have been granted and further held that the statute of limitations had been tolled from the time the class action proceedings were commenced:

… [T]he plaintiffs, along with 167 members of the proposed classes, moved together for leave to allow those 167 proposed class members to intervene in the action as plaintiffs pursuant to CPLR 1013, on the ground that “when a class action is de-certified, putative members of the de-certified class are given the opportunity to intervene into the case because of their allegations of common questions of law and fact.” The plaintiffs and the proposed intervenors (hereinafter collectively the appellants) alleged that the proposed intervenors owned property in the vicinity of BNL in 1996 and after, and presented common questions of law and fact with respect to loss of property values, and the cost of using municipal water instead of well water. They submitted a third amended complaint in support of their motion. * * *

… [T]he causes of action of the proposed intervenors are all based upon common theories of liability and, thus, satisfy the requirement of CPLR 1013 that their causes of action involve common questions of law or fact. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, BNL would not be faced with a “plethora of new claims.” Moreover, BNL did not demonstrate that intervention would substantially prejudice any party, or cause undue delay … .

To the extent BNL argues, as an alternate ground for affirmance , that the claims of the proposed intervenors are time-barred, this contention is without merit. The statute of limitations applicable to this toxic tort action is the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 214-c, which runs from the date of discovery or the date when the injury should have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence … . In American Pipe & Constr. Co. v Utah (414 US 538, 553), the United States Supreme Court held that, under the federal class action rule, commencement of a class action suit tolls the running of the statute of limitations for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status. New York courts have adopted this rule … . Osarczuk v Associated Univs., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 05653, 2nd Dept 7-1-15

 

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