You are here: / / SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE DISCRETION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND...
, , ,

SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE DISCRETION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND A COMPLAINT AFTER THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined Supreme Court did not have the discretion to grant leave to amend a complaint which had been dismissed by the First Department for lack of standing. After the appeal, plaintiff had cured the standing defect and Supreme Court allowed the amendment after the time-period to commence a new action (CPLR 205(a)) had expired:

This appeal raises the interesting question of whether a trial court has the discretion to grant a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) … , after the Appellate Division has already ordered the complaint dismissed, with direction to enter judgment. We dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs, as non-managing members of a manager-managed Delaware limited liability company, lacked capacity … or standing to act on behalf of the Company when they obtained a Certificate of Revival of the Company before filing a second amended complaint. After plaintiffs purportedly remedied this deficiency of proper standing, they sought to revive the dismissed action by seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. As aforementioned, after we had already ordered the complaint dismissed, the motion court granted plaintiffs leave to file the third amended complaint. At the time plaintiffs sought leave to amend, the time to commence a new action had expired, including the six-month grace period provided by CPLR 205(a). … Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court lacked discretion to grant plaintiffs leave to amend a complaint that had already been dismissed by this Court. * * *

Given this Court’s outright dismissal of the claims based on a finding of lack of standing, there was no action pending when plaintiffs moved for leave to file the third amended complaint. Thus, the trial court lacked any discretion or authority to grant plaintiffs such leave, where we had properly dismissed the second amended complaint before plaintiffs filed the motion to amend … .Favourite Ltd. v Cico, 2022 NY Slip Op 03987, First Dept 6-21-22

Practice Point: Once the complaint was dismissed for lack of standing by the First Department, there was no pending action. Once the time for commencing a new action pursuant to CPLR 205(a) had expired plaintiff was out of luck. Supreme Court did not have the discretion to grant plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint after it had been dismissed by the First Department.

 

You might also like
SALARIES OF UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICERS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW REQUEST (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A WALL UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED WITH A HARNESS; DEFENDANT’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT WAS SPECULATIVE (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT, A MEMBER OF THE PROUD BOYS, WAS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED GANG ASSAULT OF A MEMBER OF ANTIFA; A BOOT IS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT; EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE PROUD BOYS AND ANTIFA PROPERLY ALLOWED (FIRST DEPT).
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAY APPLY TO WINDOW FALLING ONTO PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT BUILDING MANAGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT PLAINTIFFS WERE FACING SUSPENSION OF THEIR LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW WAS NOT PROTECTED AS FAIR AND TRUE LEGAL REPORTING PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 74; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE, DISPARAGEMENT AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LANHAM ACT AND GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF FELL FROM THE SCAFFOLDING SYSTEM CONSTRUCTED BY SWING, A SUBCONTRATOR, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST SWING SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; SWING WAS NOT A CONTRACTOR OR OWNER, OR A CONTRACTOR’S OR OWNER’S STATUTORY AGENT, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTES (FIRST DEPT).
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP) ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​
ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION THAT THE ACKNOWLEDGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF A DISCHARGEABLE OFFENSE VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE COMPLAINT WAS NEVER PROPERLY AMENDED TO ADD DEFENDANT AS A PARTY PURSUANT... DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLANTIFF TO APPEAR FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION...