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THE SENTENCE FOR WEAPON-POSSESSION SHOULD BE CONCURRENT WITH THE SENTENCES FOR THE SHOOTING-RELATED CONVICTIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the sentence for weapon-possession should be concurrent with the sentences for the shooting-related convictions:

… [T]he sentence imposed on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree should not run consecutively to the concurrent sentences imposed on the convictions of manslaughter in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree. The evidence adduced at trial failed to establish that the defendant’s “possession of a gun was separate and distinct from his shooting [at the two victims, resulting in the death of one of them]” … .People v Burgess, 2022 NY Slip Op 02814, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: Unless the possession of a weapon charge is somehow distinct and separate from the possession of the weapon used in the shooting, the sentences for possession of a weapon and the shooting-related convictions should be concurrent.

 

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