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THE AFFIDAVIT FROM THE LOAN SERVICER PURPORTING TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT AVER THAT THE AFFIANT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR THE PLAINTIFF BANK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ default was not demonstrate by the complaint, which was not verified, or by the affidavit from the loan servicer, which did not aver that the affiant had the authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff bank in this foreclosure proceeding:

… Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment and order of reference. “Where, as here, a foreclosure complaint is not verified, CPLR 3215(f) states, among other things, that upon any application for a judgment by default, proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default, and the amount due are to be set forth in an affidavit ‘made by the party'” …  Here, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit executed by a contract management coordinator for the plaintiff’s purported loan servicer. However, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the affiant had the authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff … . U.S. Bank, N.A. v Stiene, 2022 NY Slip Op 01833, Second Dept 3-16-22

​Practice Point: Here, in this foreclosure action, the affidavit from the loan servicer which purported to demonstrate defendants’ default did not demonstrate the affiant had the authority to act on behalf of the bank.

 

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DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS TO THE UNITED STATES TENNIS ASSOCIATION (USTA)... THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT INCLUDE ALLEGATIONS...