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PLAINTIFF REAL ESTATE BROKER DID NOT ESTABLISH IT WAS ENTITLED TO A BROKERAGE FEE; THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT EXPIRED BY ITS OWN TERMS BEFORE THE LEASE TOOK EFFECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court after a bench trial, determined plaintiff real estate broker was not entitled to a brokerage commission:

“In order to recover a real estate brokerage commission, [a] broker must establish: (1) that [it] is duly licensed, (2) that [it] had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission, and (3) that [it] was the procuring cause of the [transaction]” … . …

Although the agreement entitled the plaintiff to collect a commission “[i]f within 60 days after the expiration . . . of th[e] . . . agreement, a lease is signed or negotiations continue and ultimately lead to a signed lease of the Property to a person or entity” on a list of potential tenants to be provided by the plaintiff within 10 days of expiration of the brokerage agreement, the lease was not signed within 60 days of the expiration of the brokerage agreement, and the plaintiff did not present any evidence that it supplied a list of potential tenants to the defendant. Thus, the brokerage agreement, by its terms, expired months before the defendant entered into a binding lease … . Cpex Real Estate, LLC v Tomtro Realty Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 00999, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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