You are here: / / THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE...

THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON ICE AND SNOW IN A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant’s summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell on ice and snow on a passageway which had not been cleared of ice and snow:

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes on owners, general contractors, and their agents a nondelegable duty to provide “reasonable and adequate protection” to workers engaged in construction, demolition, and excavation activities by complying with Industrial Code regulations that specify concrete safety directives, regardless whether they exercised supervision or control over the work … . Industrial Code § 23-1.7(d) provides that employers shall not allow any employee to use a “floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform, or other elevated work surface which is in a slippery condition,” and specifically enumerates ice and snow as foreign substances that must be removed, sanded, or covered. Plaintiff was allegedly injured at the construction site where he was working when he slipped and fell on snow and ice after he had passed through a perimeter gate, towards his employer’s shanty nearby upon arriving for work one morning. Defendant construction manager … testified the shanty area “was commonly used as a roadway for egress” and an “egress path” for workers going from the office trailers on one side of the shanties to the building under construction. Although it is unclear on this record whether there was a defined path where plaintiff fell, it is also unclear whether he was within the “shanty area” that was used as a “roadway for egress” and an “egress path.” Accordingly, issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff was in a defined walkway within the meaning of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(d) … . Lapinsky v Extell Dev. Co., 2022 NY Slip Op 00815, First Dept 2-8-22

 

You might also like
RARE SLIP AND FALL WON BY THE DEFENDANT AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEMONSTRATING A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE BOX WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S FALL (FIRST DEPT).
STIPULATION WHICH DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CALL FOR A REDUCTION OF CHILD SUPPORT UPON THE EMANCIPATION OF THE OLDEST CHILD WOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED OTHERWISE.
Proceedings Pursuant to CPL 440.10 Required to Determine Whether Defense Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Move to Reopen the Suppression Hearing When Trial Evidence Called Into Question the Arresting Officer’s Credibility
PETITIONERS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DETERMINATION IN THIS EXECUTIVE LAW 63 SPECIAL PROCEEDING SOUNDING IN FRAUD STEMMING FROM UNCONSCIONABLE EQUIPMENT FINANCE LEASES AND OPPRESSIVE DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES; RESPONDENTS’ REQUEST FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY, WHICH IS DISFAVORED IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO THE CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, WAS THE OWNER OF THE BASEMENT SPACE USED BY DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS TRESPASS ACTION, BECAUSE THE DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, AND THE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE DEEDS, WERE UNAMBIGUOUS, PAROL AGREEMENTS TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA TO DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT).
PEOPLE CONCEDED ROBBERY THIRD SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, NO NEED FOR A NEW TRIAL, CONVICTION REDUCED (FIRST DEPT). ​
THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN WHEN THE LANDLORD COULD HAVE DEMANDED PAYMENT PURSUANT TO THE LEASE, NOT WHEN THE DEMAND WAS ACTUALLY MADE YEARS LATER (FIRST DEPT).
Guilty Plea Based on a Sentence Promise that Neither the Court Nor the Parties Realized Was Illegal Requires Vacation of the Conviction in the Absence of Preservation—Notwithstanding the Fact the Sentence Was Ultimately Rendered Legal by an Enhancement Imposed Because the Defendant Violated the Terms of His Release Pending Sentencing

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, AS... THE FACT THAT THE CITY BUILDING CODE DID NOT REQUIRE DISABLED-ACCESS TO THE...