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PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO THE CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, WAS THE OWNER OF THE BASEMENT SPACE USED BY DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS TRESPASS ACTION, BECAUSE THE DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, AND THE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE DEEDS, WERE UNAMBIGUOUS, PAROL AGREEMENTS TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA TO DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on its trespass action against defendant condominium owners based on defendants’ use of a basement storage area which, according to the Declaration and Offering Plan, was owned by plaintiff. Any attempt to transfer ownership of the basement area to defendants’ condominium was ineffectual because there was never a meeting and vote by unit members:

The Declaration and Offering Plan are unambiguous and clearly state that the disputed basement space was a Limited Common Element of the front unit owned by plaintiff. The deeds to both parties’ units were silent on this issue, but provided that each buyer agreed that their ownership was subject to the Declaration. Paragraph Fifth of the Declaration provided that the use of the basement space was deemed conveyed with the conveyance of the front unit, even if the interest was not expressly described in the conveyance. In order to amend the Declaration, pursuant to paragraph Tenth(b), the board was required to execute an instrument upon the affirmative vote of 80% of the unit owners held at a duly called meeting. Moreover, paragraph Tenth(b)(I) provided that an amendment which altered the right to portions of the common elements required the consent of 100% of the affected unit owners.

Here, there was never a duly held meeting of the unit owners at which 80% voted to amend the Declaration to permit transfer of the right to use the basement space from the front unit to the rear unit. Thus, plaintiff retained the right to use the basement space. Parol evidence of the parties’ contrary intent is irrelevant in the face of the unambiguous governing documents … . Plaintiff’s acknowledgment in the contract of sale that it was not purchasing the right to use the basement storage space is not controlling because the deed contained a provision that the sale was subject to the provisions of the Declaration, which stated that the storage space was for the use of the front unit. P360 Spaces LLC v Orlando, 2018 NY Slip Op 02749, First Dept 4-27-18

​CONDOMINIUMS (PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO THE CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, WAS THE OWNER OF THE BASEMENT SPACE USED BY DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS TRESPASS ACTION, BECAUSE THE DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, AND THE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE DEEDS, WERE UNAMBIGUOUS, PAROL AGREEMENTS TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA TO DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (CONDOMINIUMS, PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO THE CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, WAS THE OWNER OF THE BASEMENT SPACE USED BY DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS TRESPASS ACTION, BECAUSE THE DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, AND THE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE DEEDS, WERE UNAMBIGUOUS, PAROL AGREEMENTS TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA TO DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT))/TRESPASS (CONDOMINIUMS,  PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO THE CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, WAS THE OWNER OF THE BASEMENT SPACE USED BY DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS TRESPASS ACTION, BECAUSE THE DECLARATION AND OFFERING PLAN, AND THE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE DEEDS, WERE UNAMBIGUOUS, PAROL AGREEMENTS TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA TO DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT))

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