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Guilty Plea Based on a Sentence Promise that Neither the Court Nor the Parties Realized Was Illegal Requires Vacation of the Conviction in the Absence of Preservation—Notwithstanding the Fact the Sentence Was Ultimately Rendered Legal by an Enhancement Imposed Because the Defendant Violated the Terms of His Release Pending Sentencing

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a two-justice dissent, determined that a guilty plea cannot stand where neither the court nor the parties was aware that the agreed upon sentence was illegal, even though the sentence was rendered “legal” by an enhancement.  The sentence promise was three years, but, given the defendant’s prior record, the minimum sentence he could legally receive was six years. Because the defendant was found to have violated the terms of his release pending sentencing, he was ultimately sentenced to six years as an enhanced sentence. The court summarized the facts and its ruling as follows:

The principal question presented here is whether a judgment of conviction, entered upon a guilty plea to a particular crime, may stand when the record discloses that neither the court nor the parties realized that the agreed upon sentence, to be imposed if defendant complied with the conditions of the plea, was illegal. Although defendant violated the conditions of his plea, and the enhanced sentence was legal, defendant is entitled to a plea vacatur for two fundamental reasons. First, defendant’s constitutional claim that his plea violated due process because it was induced by an illegal promise need not be preserved. Second, to accept a guilty plea induced by an illegal promise affects the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings as the defendant could not have had a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences … or “exercised a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant” … . People v Williams, 2014 NY Slip Op 07458, 1st Dept 10-30-14

 

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